Di bawah ini adalah terjemahan Tanya-Jawab Parlemen (Kamervragen) antara Krista van Velzen, anggota Fraksi Partai Sosialis dan Menteri Luar Negeri, Drs. M.J.M Verhagen di Parlemen Belanda pada 4 Januari 2008.
Pertanyaan 1:
Apakah anda pernah mendengar siaran radio OVT tentang peringatan ke-60 peristiwa berdarah di satu desa di Jawa, Rawagede?
Jawab:
Ya
Pertanyaan 2:
1) Apakah Anda mengakui bahwa di Rawagede pernah terjadi eksekusi di tempat (standrechtelijke executies) yang dilakukan oleh militer Belanda yang menyebabkan jatuhnya korban dalam jumlah besar?
2) Apakah Anda sepakat, terutama seperti terungkap dalam pidato Menteri Luar Negeri pada tahun 2005, bahwa dalam melancarkan aksi polisional (baca: agresi militer!) Belanda berada pada sisi yang salah dalam sejarah, dan bahwa sudah saatnya Belanda menyatakan perdamaian dan penyesalan terhadap keluarga yang ditinggalkan dari peristiwa berdarah di Rawagede? Jika tidak, mengapa demikian?
Pertanyaan 3:
Apakah Anda sepakat bahwa merupakan hal yang wajar jika anggota keluarga yang ditinggalkan mengharapkan pembayaran uang pensiun atau tunjangan finansial dalam bentuk lain? Jika ya, bagaimana Anda melihat cara untuk memenuhi hal tersebut? Jika tidak, mengapa demikian?
Pertanyaan 4:
Apakah Anda sepakat bahwa merupakan hal sepantasnya, jika 16 orang keluarga korban yang masih hidup saat ini, diundang ke Belanda, agar pemerintah dapat menyampaikan penyesalannya kepada mereka atas pembunuhan massal di Rawagede pada Desember 1947?
Jawab:
Seperti yang telah diketahui bersama, Mrs. Sorgdrager sebagai Menteri Hukum pada tahun 1995, sehubungan dengan penelitian orientasi dari Kementrian Umum terhadap peristiwa di Rawagede, telah dinyatakan bahwa tentara Belanda telah melakukan pembunuhan massal dimana sejumlah besar korban jatuh. Juga dinyatakan bahwa tuntutan terhadap tindak pidana ini tidak lagi dimungkinkan. Penelitian lebih lanjut mengenai hal ini juga tidak terlalu ditanggapi dengan berarti (kamerstuk 1190. Tahun rapat 1994-1995). Saya mengikuti hal tersebut.
Pada tanggal 9 desember 2007 seorang wakil dari Kedutaan Besar Kerajaan Belanda di Jakarta, atas nama Duta Besar, hadir pada acara peringatan di Rawagede dimana disampaikan penghormatan dan keprihatinan kepada korban dan keluarga korban dari tragedi ini yang masih hidup. Hal ini sangat dihargai oleh panitia organisasi Indonesia dalam upacara ini. Undangan bagi korban saat ini dalam upaya menyampaikan penyesalan pemerintah, saya rasa dalam hal ini tidak lagi diperlukan.
Dalam rangka peringatan enam puluh tahun “proklamasi” (pernyataan kemerdekaan Republik Indonesia) telah dinyatakan oleh pendahulu saya (kamerstuk 26 049, nr. 48. Tahun rapat 2004-2005) atas nama pemerintah telah disampaikan kepada Pemerintah Indonesia penyesalan mendalam atas cara-cara penuh kekerasan yang menyakitkan yang terjadi, dimana jalan antara Belanda dan Indonesia menjadi terpisah, yang diikuti oleh periode pernyataan kemerdekaan oleh Indonesia pada hari kemerdekaan tanggal 17 Agustus 1945, sebagai akibat dari tindakan Belanda pada masa lalu.
Pada kesempatan tersebut, baik Pemerintah Indonesia maupun Belanda telah menyatakan, bahwa suatu diskusi mengenai kompensasi tidak menjadi bahan pembicaraan dengan demikian telah ditarik garis di bawah bagian dari sejarah bersama tersebut.
Pertanyaan 5:
Apakah Anda sepakat bahwa, sebagaimana tergambarkan dari pidato pendahulu Anda pada tahun 2005, para wajib militer yang menolak aksi polisional (baca: agresi militer) dinyatakan berada sebagai “pihak yang benar dalam sejarah”? Jika tidak, mengapa demikian?
Apakah Anda sepakat bahwa justru benar adanya untuk menyimpulkan bahwa para penolak wajib militer terhadap aksi polisional (baca: agresi militer) tersebut dimaafkan dan seharusnya diberikan kehormatan? Jika ya, bagaimana Anda akan melakukan hal tersebut? Dan jika tidak, mengapa demikian?
Jawab:
Pernyataan dari pendahulu saya pada tahun 2005 berhubungan dengan pilihan politik yang pada saat itu dilakukan dan tidak berhubungan dengan wajib militer Belanda dan penolakan dari beberapa dari mereka untuk ikut dalam wajib militer yang berlaku saat itu. Pertimbangan untuk memberikan pemulihan kehormatan/rehabilitasi kepada mereka yang menolak wajib militer saat itu maka dinyatakan tidak lagi relevan.
Pertanyaan 6:
Dapatkah Anda menjawab pertanyaan-pertanyaan ini di hadapan pertimbangan umum tentang Indonesia, sebelum tanggal 31 Januari 2008?
Jawab:
Ya
-------------------------------------------------------------
Radio 1 journaal dan OVT, 9 Desember 2007: http://geschiedenis.vpro.nl/programmas/3299530/afleveringen/december2007/.
Lihat juga: Trouw, 12 Desember 2007 “Hoog tijd bloedbad op Java te erkennen”:
http://prod.trouw.nl/deverdieping/podium/article867165.ece/Hoog_tijd_bloedbad_op_Java_te_erkennen_opinie
Petisi online terhadap Pemerintah Belanda, yang juga didukung oleh beberapa orang Belanda, dapat dilihat di:
http://www.petitiononline.com/brh41244/petition.html
Wednesday, January 30, 2008
Saturday, January 26, 2008
Kamervragen, Krista van Velzen - Drs. M.J.M Verhagen
Subject:Rawagede
Date: Thu, 17 Jan 2008 17:21:18 +0700
From: "JAK-CDP"
To: batara44rh@yahoo.com
Geachte heer Hutagalung,
Conform uw gesprek met ambassadeur Dr. N. van Dam treft u in bijlage
Kamervragen rondom Rawagede.
Met vriendelijke groet,
Gretha Metekohy
Secretaresse Ambassadeur Jakarta
*********************************
Hr. Ms. Ambassade Jakarta
Jl. H.R. Rasuna Said Kaveling S-3
Jakarta 12950
T: +62 21 5241009
F: +62 21 5700734
@: jak-cdp@minbuza.nl
*********************************
Directie Azië en Oceanië
Bezuidenhoutseweg 67
Postbus 20061
2500 EB Den Haag
Aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal
Binnenhof 4
Den Haag
Datum 16 januari 2008
Kenmerk DAO-008/08
Blad 1/1
Betreft Beantwoording vragen van het lid Van Velzen over de massamoord in Rawagede
Behandeld E.H.W. van den Akker
Telefoon + 31 70 348 6008
Fax + 31 70 348 5323
Email EHW-vanden.Akker@minbuza.nl
Graag bied ik u hierbij de antwoorden aan op de schriftelijke vragen gesteld door het lid Van Velzen over de massamoord in Rawagede. Deze vragen werden ingezonden op 4 januari 2008 met kenmerk 2070807650.
De minister van Buitenlandse Zaken,
Drs. M.J.M. Verhagen
Antwoord van de heer Verhagen, Minister van Buitenlandse zaken op vragen van het lid Van Velzen (SP) over de massamoord in Rawagede in 1947.
Vraag 1
Hebt u kennis genomen van de radiouitzending van OVT over de 60e verjaardag van de bloedige gebeurtenissen in het Javaanse dorp Rawagede? 1)
Antwoord
Ja.
Vraag 2
Erkent u dat in Rawagede door Nederlandse militairen standrechtelijke executies zijn uitgevoerd waarbij een groot aantal slachtoffers is gevallen? 2) Deelt u de mening dat het, zeker in het licht van de uitspraken van de minister van Buitenlandse Zaken in 2005 dat Nederland in de politionele acties aan de verkeerde kant van de geschiedenis stond, tijd wordt voor een gebaar van verzoening en spijt richting de nabestaanden van de bloederige gebeurtenissen in Rawagede? Zo neen, waarom niet?
Vraag 3
Deelt u tevens de mening dat het wenselijk is de overlevenden een pensioen of andere vorm van financiële tegemoetkoming uit te betalen? Zo ja, op welke wijze wilt u daarin voorzien? Zo neen, waarom niet?
Vraag 4
Deelt u de mening dat wenselijk is de huidige 16 overlevenden, naar Nederland uit te nodigen, teneinde tegenover hen de spijt van de regering uit te drukken over de moordpartij in Rawagede in december 1947?
Antwoord
Zoals bekend heeft mw. Sorgdrager als minister van Justitie in 1995 naar aanleiding van een oriënterend onderzoek door het openbaar ministerie naar de gebeurtenissen te Rawagede, vastgesteld dat het Nederlandse leger standrechtelijke executies heeft uitgevoerd waarbij een groot aantal slachtoffers is gevallen. Tevens werd vastgesteld dat vervolging van de desbetreffende misdrijven niet meer mogelijk was. Een nader onderzoek naar deze misdrijven werd derhalve niet zinvol geacht. (Kamerstuk 1190, vergaderjaar 1994-1995). Ik sluit mij aan bij die bevindingen.
Op 9 december 2007 heeft een vertegenwoordiger van de Nederlandse Ambassade te Jakarta, namens de Ambassadeur, deelgenomen aan een herdenkingsplechtigheid te Rawagede waarbij respect en medeleven is overgebracht aan de overlevenden en nabestaanden van deze tragedie. Dit werd zeer gewaardeerd door het Indonesische organisatiecomité van deze plechtigheid. Een uitnodiging aan de huidige overlevenden teneinde de spijt uit te drukken van de regering acht ik in dit licht bezien onnodig.
Ter gelegenheid van de viering van de zestigste verjaardag van de “Proklamasi” (het uitroepen van de de onafhankelijke Republiek Indonesië) is door mijn ambtsvoorganger (Kamerstuk 26 049, nr. 48, vergaderjaar 2004-2005), namens de regering aan de Indonesische autoriteiten diepe spijt betuigd over de pijnlijke en gewelddadige wijze waarop de wegen van Nederland en Indonesië zich in de periode volgend op het uitroepen door Indonesië van de onafhankelijkheid op 17 augustus 1945, als gevolg van het toenmalige Nederlandse optreden hebben gescheiden.
Zowel de Indonesische als de Nederlandse regering hebben bij die gelegenheid kenbaar gemaakt dat een discussie over compensatie niet aan de orde was waarmee een streep is gezet onder dit deel van de gezamenlijke geschiedenis.
Vraag 5
Deelt u de mening dat, zeker gezien de uitspraak van uw voorganger in 2005, dienstplichtigen die weigerden aan de politionele acties deel te nemen aan de ‘goede kant van de geschiedenis’ stonden? Zo neen, waarom niet? Deelt u de mening dat het juist is te concluderen dat de dienstweigeraars uit de politionele acties gepardonneerd en in ere hersteld zouden moeten worden? Zo ja, op welke wijze wilt u dat doen? Zo neen, waarom niet?
Antwoord
De uitspraken van mijn voorganger uit 2005 hadden betrekking op de politieke keuzes die destijds zijn gemaakt en niet op de toenmalige inzet van Nederlandse dienstplichtigen en de weigering van sommigen van hen om aan de toen geldende dienstplicht te voldoen. Een oordeel over al dan niet eerherstel van dienstweigeraars destijds is dan ook niet aan de orde.
Vraag 6
Kunt u deze vragen ruim voor het algemeen overleg over Indonesië, momenteel voorzien op 31 januari 2008, beantwoorden?
Antwoord
Ja.
1) Radio 1 journaal en OVT, 9 december 2007 http://geschiedenis.vpro.nl/programmas/3299530/afleveringen/december2007/.
Zie tevens Trouw, 12 december 2007 “Hoog tijd bloedbad op Java te erkennen”
http://prod.trouw.nl/deverdieping/podium/article867165.ece/Hoog_tijd_bloedbad_op_Java_te_erkennen_opinie
2) Aanhangsel Handelingen, vergaderjaar 1994-1995, nrs. 1153 en 1190
Date: Thu, 17 Jan 2008 17:21:18 +0700
From: "JAK-CDP"
To: batara44rh@yahoo.com
Geachte heer Hutagalung,
Conform uw gesprek met ambassadeur Dr. N. van Dam treft u in bijlage
Kamervragen rondom Rawagede.
Met vriendelijke groet,
Gretha Metekohy
Secretaresse Ambassadeur Jakarta
*********************************
Hr. Ms. Ambassade Jakarta
Jl. H.R. Rasuna Said Kaveling S-3
Jakarta 12950
T: +62 21 5241009
F: +62 21 5700734
@: jak-cdp@minbuza.nl
*********************************
Directie Azië en Oceanië
Bezuidenhoutseweg 67
Postbus 20061
2500 EB Den Haag
Aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal
Binnenhof 4
Den Haag
Datum 16 januari 2008
Kenmerk DAO-008/08
Blad 1/1
Betreft Beantwoording vragen van het lid Van Velzen over de massamoord in Rawagede
Behandeld E.H.W. van den Akker
Telefoon + 31 70 348 6008
Fax + 31 70 348 5323
Email EHW-vanden.Akker@minbuza.nl
Graag bied ik u hierbij de antwoorden aan op de schriftelijke vragen gesteld door het lid Van Velzen over de massamoord in Rawagede. Deze vragen werden ingezonden op 4 januari 2008 met kenmerk 2070807650.
De minister van Buitenlandse Zaken,
Drs. M.J.M. Verhagen
Antwoord van de heer Verhagen, Minister van Buitenlandse zaken op vragen van het lid Van Velzen (SP) over de massamoord in Rawagede in 1947.
Vraag 1
Hebt u kennis genomen van de radiouitzending van OVT over de 60e verjaardag van de bloedige gebeurtenissen in het Javaanse dorp Rawagede? 1)
Antwoord
Ja.
Vraag 2
Erkent u dat in Rawagede door Nederlandse militairen standrechtelijke executies zijn uitgevoerd waarbij een groot aantal slachtoffers is gevallen? 2) Deelt u de mening dat het, zeker in het licht van de uitspraken van de minister van Buitenlandse Zaken in 2005 dat Nederland in de politionele acties aan de verkeerde kant van de geschiedenis stond, tijd wordt voor een gebaar van verzoening en spijt richting de nabestaanden van de bloederige gebeurtenissen in Rawagede? Zo neen, waarom niet?
Vraag 3
Deelt u tevens de mening dat het wenselijk is de overlevenden een pensioen of andere vorm van financiële tegemoetkoming uit te betalen? Zo ja, op welke wijze wilt u daarin voorzien? Zo neen, waarom niet?
Vraag 4
Deelt u de mening dat wenselijk is de huidige 16 overlevenden, naar Nederland uit te nodigen, teneinde tegenover hen de spijt van de regering uit te drukken over de moordpartij in Rawagede in december 1947?
Antwoord
Zoals bekend heeft mw. Sorgdrager als minister van Justitie in 1995 naar aanleiding van een oriënterend onderzoek door het openbaar ministerie naar de gebeurtenissen te Rawagede, vastgesteld dat het Nederlandse leger standrechtelijke executies heeft uitgevoerd waarbij een groot aantal slachtoffers is gevallen. Tevens werd vastgesteld dat vervolging van de desbetreffende misdrijven niet meer mogelijk was. Een nader onderzoek naar deze misdrijven werd derhalve niet zinvol geacht. (Kamerstuk 1190, vergaderjaar 1994-1995). Ik sluit mij aan bij die bevindingen.
Op 9 december 2007 heeft een vertegenwoordiger van de Nederlandse Ambassade te Jakarta, namens de Ambassadeur, deelgenomen aan een herdenkingsplechtigheid te Rawagede waarbij respect en medeleven is overgebracht aan de overlevenden en nabestaanden van deze tragedie. Dit werd zeer gewaardeerd door het Indonesische organisatiecomité van deze plechtigheid. Een uitnodiging aan de huidige overlevenden teneinde de spijt uit te drukken van de regering acht ik in dit licht bezien onnodig.
Ter gelegenheid van de viering van de zestigste verjaardag van de “Proklamasi” (het uitroepen van de de onafhankelijke Republiek Indonesië) is door mijn ambtsvoorganger (Kamerstuk 26 049, nr. 48, vergaderjaar 2004-2005), namens de regering aan de Indonesische autoriteiten diepe spijt betuigd over de pijnlijke en gewelddadige wijze waarop de wegen van Nederland en Indonesië zich in de periode volgend op het uitroepen door Indonesië van de onafhankelijkheid op 17 augustus 1945, als gevolg van het toenmalige Nederlandse optreden hebben gescheiden.
Zowel de Indonesische als de Nederlandse regering hebben bij die gelegenheid kenbaar gemaakt dat een discussie over compensatie niet aan de orde was waarmee een streep is gezet onder dit deel van de gezamenlijke geschiedenis.
Vraag 5
Deelt u de mening dat, zeker gezien de uitspraak van uw voorganger in 2005, dienstplichtigen die weigerden aan de politionele acties deel te nemen aan de ‘goede kant van de geschiedenis’ stonden? Zo neen, waarom niet? Deelt u de mening dat het juist is te concluderen dat de dienstweigeraars uit de politionele acties gepardonneerd en in ere hersteld zouden moeten worden? Zo ja, op welke wijze wilt u dat doen? Zo neen, waarom niet?
Antwoord
De uitspraken van mijn voorganger uit 2005 hadden betrekking op de politieke keuzes die destijds zijn gemaakt en niet op de toenmalige inzet van Nederlandse dienstplichtigen en de weigering van sommigen van hen om aan de toen geldende dienstplicht te voldoen. Een oordeel over al dan niet eerherstel van dienstweigeraars destijds is dan ook niet aan de orde.
Vraag 6
Kunt u deze vragen ruim voor het algemeen overleg over Indonesië, momenteel voorzien op 31 januari 2008, beantwoorden?
Antwoord
Ja.
1) Radio 1 journaal en OVT, 9 december 2007 http://geschiedenis.vpro.nl/programmas/3299530/afleveringen/december2007/.
Zie tevens Trouw, 12 december 2007 “Hoog tijd bloedbad op Java te erkennen”
http://prod.trouw.nl/deverdieping/podium/article867165.ece/Hoog_tijd_bloedbad_op_Java_te_erkennen_opinie
2) Aanhangsel Handelingen, vergaderjaar 1994-1995, nrs. 1153 en 1190
Friday, January 25, 2008
Tragedy of Rawagede Massacre, December 9, 1947
The Forgotten Dutch Military Aggression’s Victims
By Batara R. Hutagalung
Chairman of The Committee of Dutch Honorary Debts
On December 9, 2007 at the Rawagede monument, the 60th commemoration of the massacre in the Rawagede village was held.
On December 1947, in military aggression by the Dutch started since July 21, 1947; Dutch military members have slaughtered 431 people of Rawagede village near Karawang, West Java . On October 1948, Dutch military again conducted ‘sweeping’ in Rawagede, and this time 35 more people were killed. The massacre of village people in Rawagede is the second largest massacre after the massacre by Dutch military members in South Sulawesi between December 1946 to February 1947. Until August 1949, thousands of people were still being murdered without legal inquiries. During its aggression in Indonesia between 1945-1950, Dutch military have conducted various atrocities and crimes against humanity and severe human rights abuses, include rape against Indonesian women who have been captured by Dutch military personnel.
Ironically, all the crimes and human rights abuses were done by Dutch military after the end of the World War II on 1945, after the Dutch have been freed from German’ military aggression and hundred thousands of Dutch people were released from Japanese Internment camps where they were detained from 1942-1945.
Netherlands, which is member of nations which victimize by German and Japan’ military aggression, which also made inquiries on German and Japan as perpetrator of war crimes and human rights abuse. But later, Dutch military did the same thing, and responsible for various war crimes and crimes against humanity in its efforts to reinstate its colonialism in Indonesia.
Background
Japan initiated its military aggression in East Asia by attacking the United States ’ military hub in Pearl Harbour, on December 1941. Then Japan attacked South East Asia , include Dutch’ colony which was Nederlands Indie. France , England and Dutch colonies in the region were one by one seized by Japan .
On March 1, 1942, Japanese army XVI under command of Lieutenant General Hitoshi Imamura attacked Java island, after Japan Navy destroyed Allies’ armies ABDACOM (American, British, Dutch, Australian Command) in a battle which known today as ‘the Battle of Java Sea’.
After the fight that last a week, Dutch military members in Dutch Indies almost without struggle, surrendered to Japanese army. On March 9, 1942 in Kalijati, near Subang, West Java, Lieutenant General Hein Ter Poorten, the top command of Dutch military in Dutch-Indies, representing Governor General of Dutch Indies, Jonkheer Alidus Warmmoldus Lambertus Tjarda van Starkenborgh-Stachouwer, signed a document of unconditional surrender and handed over all Dutch colonies to Japan. Therefore, March 9, 1942 marked the end of more than 300 years Dutch colonialism in Indonesia.
On August 15, 1945, Japan declared surrender to the Allies but the unconditional surrender document was signed on September 2, 1945, on board of US warship ‘USS Missouri’ in Tokyo Bay; which brought the vacuum of power during the two dates in all Japanese colonies include ex Dutch colonies which have been handed over to Japan.
On August 17, 1945, during the vacuum of power, Indonesian leaders have declared the Independence of Indonesia, and on August 18, 1945, have establish a government; which by thus, have fulfilled the three conditions to establish a nation, which are : 1. The presence of areas, 2. The presence of population, and 3. The presence of government.
On November 1946, the League of Arab Nations include Egypt, issued a resolution which acknowledged Indonesian independence as free and sovereign nation. It is a de jure acknowledgement according to International law.
After ‘surrendering’ its colonies formally to Japan, the Dutch have lost its rights and legitimation on Dutch-Indies. Therefore, when Indonesian people declared independence on August 17, 1945, this should not regarded as a coup against the Dutch.
The Dutch had been successful to obtain support from British to reinstate its colonialism in Indonesia, and these were enacted in Civil Affairs Agreement (CAA) which was signed in Chequers, England, on August 24, 1945. In CAA, British would ‘clean-up’ any military powers of Republic of Indonesia, to be transferred to NICA (Netherlands Indies Civil Administration).
These are recorded in command of Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Commander S.E.Asia Command, dated September 2, 1945, which given to Commander of Division 5, which stated:
“…You are instructed to proceed with all speed to the island of Java in the East Indies to accept the surrender of Japanese Imperial Forces on that island, and to release Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees.
In keeping with the provisions of the Yalta Conference you will re-establish civilians rule and return the colony to the Dutch Administration, when it is in a position to maintain services.
As you are no doubt aware, the local natives have declared a Republic, but we are bound to maintain the status quo which existed before the Japanese Invasion…”
Under assistance of 3 divisions of British army under command of Lieutenant General Phillip Christison and 2 divisions of Australian army under command of Lieutenant General Leslie “Ming the Merciless” Morsehead, gradually the Dutch acquired its power in Indonesia. On July 13, 1946, Australia ‘surrendered’ East Indonesia region to the Dutch, and on July 15-25, 1946, ex Dutch Vice Governor General, Dr. Van Mook, organized ‘Malino Conference’, near Makassar, to establish the East Indonesia State.
During the ‘clean-up period’ by British and Australian military, the Dutch sent more soldiers from Netherlands; in order when British and Australia pulled out their military personnel from Indonesia, the Dutch military power would be able to be immediate replacement. At that time, Dutch military members had exceeded 100,000 people and continuously increased to 200,000 people, with modern artilleries include heavy warfare which granted by British and Australian military.
Linggajati Agreement and Dutch Military Aggression I
British facilitated negotiation between Republic of Indonesia and Dutch in Linggajati. On November 15, 1946, Linggajati agreement was drafted; and on March 25, 1947, the agreement was formally signed by the government of Republic of Indonesia and Dutch government in Jakarta .
The Dutch was clearly using delay strategy, to strengthen its army in Indonesia by continuously shipped more people from Netherlands .
Linggajati aggrement lasted less than 4 months due to breach by the Dutch, by conducted military aggression which started on July 21, 1947, under code "Operatie Product". As a mask to International community, the Dutch named this aggression as ‘police action’; and declared the acts as internal affairs, which equivalent to statement that Indonesia was still its colony.
Republic of Indonesia reported this aggression to the United Nations, due to its breach against international agreement which is Linggajati agreement. Security Council of the United Nations issued Resolution No. 27, dated August 1, 1947, which called for cease of conflict.
United Nations Security Council has been de facto acknowledged the existence of Republic of Indonesia ; which is proven by formally addressed ‘INDONESIA’ in its resolution, and not ‘Netherlands Indies’. Since the first resolution, which is Resolution No. 27 on August 1, 1947, followed by Resolution No. 30 and No. 31 dated August 25, 1947, Resolution No. 36 on November 1, 1947, and Resolution No. 67 on January 28, 1949, Security Council of the United Nations always referred conflict between Republic of Indonesia and Netherlands as ‘The Indonesian Question’.
Under pressure of United Nations Security Council, on August 15, 1947, the Dutch government finally accepted resolution of United Nations Security Council to stop the fight.
On August 17, 1947, government of Republic of Indonesia and the Dutch government agreed on resolution of United Nations Security Council to cease-fire, and on August 25, 1947, United Nations Security Council established a committee to mediate conflict between Indonesia and the Dutch. This committee acted as Committee of Good Offices for Indonesia, widely known as ‘Committee of Three Nations’, due to the three nations which were its members : Australia which was appointed by Indonesia, Belgium which was appointed by Netherlands and the United States as the neutral party.
Facilitated by Committee of Good Offices for Indonesia , on December 8, 1947, a negotiation was initiated between the Dutch and Indonesia in USS Renville as neutral place.
Rawagede Massacre
Eventhough cease-fire agreement has been signed and during the negotiation in USS Renville, in West Java, the Dutch army from Division 1 which also known as Division of December 7, continued to hunt Indonesian army and patriots who fought against the Dutch. Dutch army which took part in Operation in Karawang areas were Detachment 3-9 RI, 1e para compagnie and 12 Genie veld compagnie, which were support brigade from paramilitary and DST (Depot Speciaale Troepen).
On December 9, 1947, a day after the initiation of Renville negotiation, Dutch army under command of Major Alfons Wijnen, attacked Rawagede village and raided houses. But they did not find members of Indonesia army. This triggered them to force people to get out from their homes to be gathered in a field. Males above 15 years were ordered to stand side by side, and then questioned on the presence of Republic fighters. But none of the people were willing to reveal the location of Indonesian fighters.
The Dutch Officer then commanded to shoot dead all male villagers, include teenagers as young as 12 years. Few people were able to escape to the forest, even though they suffered bullet wounds. Sa'ih, one of the survivors, now aged 83, told a story how he and his father and neighbors about 20 people were ordered to stand in a line. The Dutch army then emptied their machine weapons onto them, and his father who stood next to them died instantly by the bullets. He also shot in his hand, but he fell on the ground and feigned to be death. He ran away when he found chance.
On that day, Dutch army massacred 431 people of Rawagede; without legal inquiry, lawsuit nor defense. Same as in South Sulawesi, the Dutch army in Rawagede have conducted what they referred as a summary execution (standrechtelijke excecuties); an act which clearly categorized as war crimes which is murder of non-combatants. It was estimated that the actual victims were more than 431, since many have been swept away by torrential flood due to heavy rain.
The downpours caused pool of bloods continue to drench the village. What left were women and children. The next day, after the Dutch army left the village, the women buried the bodies with in-adequate equipments. One mother buried her husband and two sons aged 12 and 15 years. They could not dug deep, only 50 centimeters, which caused the stenches stayed for days.
This massacre was also known by Committee of Good Offices for Indonesia from the United Nations. But the commission’ reaction was limited to ‘critic’ against the military action which they called “deliberate and ruthless”, without further strict sanction due to human-rights abuse; let alone treating this massacre against innocent people as war crimes.
Now, there are 9 widows of the victims and 1 survivor of Rawagede massacre on December 9, 1947. The youngest, Imi, now aged 75. At that time, she was 15 years old and just married for 3 days when her husband was shot dead before her eyes. Since then, she is not married. All of them are only illiterate village people.
De Excessennota
On January 1969, under pressure of Dutch parliament, the Dutch government established a team to review archives which submitted to Dutch government, in order to investigate misconducts by Dutch military members (KL, Koninklijke Landmacht and KNIL, Koninklijke Nederlands-Indische Leger), in Indonesia during 1945-1950. After conducting analysis in 5 months, the results were compiled in a report under title “Nota betreffende het archievenonderzoek naar gegevens omtrent excessen in Indonesië begaan door Nederlandse militairen in de periode 1945-1950”, shortened as De Excessennota. This formal report was presented by Prime Minister deJong on June 2, 1969. This report which prepared in a hurry only put 140 ‘excess’ which done by Dutch army, despite many other incidents; since there were large murder cases done by Dutch military personnel were not included in the Excessennota.
In Netherlands, many parties have clearly denounce that what have been done by Dutch military during this period are war crimes (oorlogs-misdaden) and not a mere excess.
The massacre in Rawagede, South Sulawesi and many other severe crimes against humanity, are only small evidences of Dutch military’ war crimes, in its efforts to re-colonialize Indonesia, after Indonesian people declared independence.
On August 16, 2005, in Jakarta , Dutch Foreign Minister Ben Bot stated that:
“…In retrospect, it is clear that its large-scale deployment of military forces in 1947 put the Netherlands on the wrong side of history. The fact that military action was taken and that many people on both sides lost their lives or were wounded is a harsh and bitter reality especially for you, the people of the Republic of Indonesia . A large number of your people are estimated to have died as a result of the action taken by the Netherlands ...”
But this statement has been served as a mere lip service, since the Dutch government continues to remain irresponsible on various massacres on non-combatant people of Indonesia, and 60 years after these tragedies, remained unwilling to compensate the surviving victims, widows and family members of victims of Dutch army’ atrocities conducted during its military aggression in Indonesia between 1945-1950.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Petition to urge the Netherlands Government,
to recognize de jure Indonesian Independence Day was on August 17th 1945, and
to apologize for the colonialization, slavery, violation of human rights and horrific crimes against humanity
http://www.petitiononline.com/brh41244/petition.html
By Batara R. Hutagalung
Chairman of The Committee of Dutch Honorary Debts
On December 9, 2007 at the Rawagede monument, the 60th commemoration of the massacre in the Rawagede village was held.
On December 1947, in military aggression by the Dutch started since July 21, 1947; Dutch military members have slaughtered 431 people of Rawagede village near Karawang, West Java . On October 1948, Dutch military again conducted ‘sweeping’ in Rawagede, and this time 35 more people were killed. The massacre of village people in Rawagede is the second largest massacre after the massacre by Dutch military members in South Sulawesi between December 1946 to February 1947. Until August 1949, thousands of people were still being murdered without legal inquiries. During its aggression in Indonesia between 1945-1950, Dutch military have conducted various atrocities and crimes against humanity and severe human rights abuses, include rape against Indonesian women who have been captured by Dutch military personnel.
Ironically, all the crimes and human rights abuses were done by Dutch military after the end of the World War II on 1945, after the Dutch have been freed from German’ military aggression and hundred thousands of Dutch people were released from Japanese Internment camps where they were detained from 1942-1945.
Netherlands, which is member of nations which victimize by German and Japan’ military aggression, which also made inquiries on German and Japan as perpetrator of war crimes and human rights abuse. But later, Dutch military did the same thing, and responsible for various war crimes and crimes against humanity in its efforts to reinstate its colonialism in Indonesia.
Background
Japan initiated its military aggression in East Asia by attacking the United States ’ military hub in Pearl Harbour, on December 1941. Then Japan attacked South East Asia , include Dutch’ colony which was Nederlands Indie. France , England and Dutch colonies in the region were one by one seized by Japan .
On March 1, 1942, Japanese army XVI under command of Lieutenant General Hitoshi Imamura attacked Java island, after Japan Navy destroyed Allies’ armies ABDACOM (American, British, Dutch, Australian Command) in a battle which known today as ‘the Battle of Java Sea’.
After the fight that last a week, Dutch military members in Dutch Indies almost without struggle, surrendered to Japanese army. On March 9, 1942 in Kalijati, near Subang, West Java, Lieutenant General Hein Ter Poorten, the top command of Dutch military in Dutch-Indies, representing Governor General of Dutch Indies, Jonkheer Alidus Warmmoldus Lambertus Tjarda van Starkenborgh-Stachouwer, signed a document of unconditional surrender and handed over all Dutch colonies to Japan. Therefore, March 9, 1942 marked the end of more than 300 years Dutch colonialism in Indonesia.
On August 15, 1945, Japan declared surrender to the Allies but the unconditional surrender document was signed on September 2, 1945, on board of US warship ‘USS Missouri’ in Tokyo Bay; which brought the vacuum of power during the two dates in all Japanese colonies include ex Dutch colonies which have been handed over to Japan.
On August 17, 1945, during the vacuum of power, Indonesian leaders have declared the Independence of Indonesia, and on August 18, 1945, have establish a government; which by thus, have fulfilled the three conditions to establish a nation, which are : 1. The presence of areas, 2. The presence of population, and 3. The presence of government.
On November 1946, the League of Arab Nations include Egypt, issued a resolution which acknowledged Indonesian independence as free and sovereign nation. It is a de jure acknowledgement according to International law.
After ‘surrendering’ its colonies formally to Japan, the Dutch have lost its rights and legitimation on Dutch-Indies. Therefore, when Indonesian people declared independence on August 17, 1945, this should not regarded as a coup against the Dutch.
The Dutch had been successful to obtain support from British to reinstate its colonialism in Indonesia, and these were enacted in Civil Affairs Agreement (CAA) which was signed in Chequers, England, on August 24, 1945. In CAA, British would ‘clean-up’ any military powers of Republic of Indonesia, to be transferred to NICA (Netherlands Indies Civil Administration).
These are recorded in command of Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Commander S.E.Asia Command, dated September 2, 1945, which given to Commander of Division 5, which stated:
“…You are instructed to proceed with all speed to the island of Java in the East Indies to accept the surrender of Japanese Imperial Forces on that island, and to release Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees.
In keeping with the provisions of the Yalta Conference you will re-establish civilians rule and return the colony to the Dutch Administration, when it is in a position to maintain services.
As you are no doubt aware, the local natives have declared a Republic, but we are bound to maintain the status quo which existed before the Japanese Invasion…”
Under assistance of 3 divisions of British army under command of Lieutenant General Phillip Christison and 2 divisions of Australian army under command of Lieutenant General Leslie “Ming the Merciless” Morsehead, gradually the Dutch acquired its power in Indonesia. On July 13, 1946, Australia ‘surrendered’ East Indonesia region to the Dutch, and on July 15-25, 1946, ex Dutch Vice Governor General, Dr. Van Mook, organized ‘Malino Conference’, near Makassar, to establish the East Indonesia State.
During the ‘clean-up period’ by British and Australian military, the Dutch sent more soldiers from Netherlands; in order when British and Australia pulled out their military personnel from Indonesia, the Dutch military power would be able to be immediate replacement. At that time, Dutch military members had exceeded 100,000 people and continuously increased to 200,000 people, with modern artilleries include heavy warfare which granted by British and Australian military.
Linggajati Agreement and Dutch Military Aggression I
British facilitated negotiation between Republic of Indonesia and Dutch in Linggajati. On November 15, 1946, Linggajati agreement was drafted; and on March 25, 1947, the agreement was formally signed by the government of Republic of Indonesia and Dutch government in Jakarta .
The Dutch was clearly using delay strategy, to strengthen its army in Indonesia by continuously shipped more people from Netherlands .
Linggajati aggrement lasted less than 4 months due to breach by the Dutch, by conducted military aggression which started on July 21, 1947, under code "Operatie Product". As a mask to International community, the Dutch named this aggression as ‘police action’; and declared the acts as internal affairs, which equivalent to statement that Indonesia was still its colony.
Republic of Indonesia reported this aggression to the United Nations, due to its breach against international agreement which is Linggajati agreement. Security Council of the United Nations issued Resolution No. 27, dated August 1, 1947, which called for cease of conflict.
United Nations Security Council has been de facto acknowledged the existence of Republic of Indonesia ; which is proven by formally addressed ‘INDONESIA’ in its resolution, and not ‘Netherlands Indies’. Since the first resolution, which is Resolution No. 27 on August 1, 1947, followed by Resolution No. 30 and No. 31 dated August 25, 1947, Resolution No. 36 on November 1, 1947, and Resolution No. 67 on January 28, 1949, Security Council of the United Nations always referred conflict between Republic of Indonesia and Netherlands as ‘The Indonesian Question’.
Under pressure of United Nations Security Council, on August 15, 1947, the Dutch government finally accepted resolution of United Nations Security Council to stop the fight.
On August 17, 1947, government of Republic of Indonesia and the Dutch government agreed on resolution of United Nations Security Council to cease-fire, and on August 25, 1947, United Nations Security Council established a committee to mediate conflict between Indonesia and the Dutch. This committee acted as Committee of Good Offices for Indonesia, widely known as ‘Committee of Three Nations’, due to the three nations which were its members : Australia which was appointed by Indonesia, Belgium which was appointed by Netherlands and the United States as the neutral party.
Facilitated by Committee of Good Offices for Indonesia , on December 8, 1947, a negotiation was initiated between the Dutch and Indonesia in USS Renville as neutral place.
Rawagede Massacre
Eventhough cease-fire agreement has been signed and during the negotiation in USS Renville, in West Java, the Dutch army from Division 1 which also known as Division of December 7, continued to hunt Indonesian army and patriots who fought against the Dutch. Dutch army which took part in Operation in Karawang areas were Detachment 3-9 RI, 1e para compagnie and 12 Genie veld compagnie, which were support brigade from paramilitary and DST (Depot Speciaale Troepen).
On December 9, 1947, a day after the initiation of Renville negotiation, Dutch army under command of Major Alfons Wijnen, attacked Rawagede village and raided houses. But they did not find members of Indonesia army. This triggered them to force people to get out from their homes to be gathered in a field. Males above 15 years were ordered to stand side by side, and then questioned on the presence of Republic fighters. But none of the people were willing to reveal the location of Indonesian fighters.
The Dutch Officer then commanded to shoot dead all male villagers, include teenagers as young as 12 years. Few people were able to escape to the forest, even though they suffered bullet wounds. Sa'ih, one of the survivors, now aged 83, told a story how he and his father and neighbors about 20 people were ordered to stand in a line. The Dutch army then emptied their machine weapons onto them, and his father who stood next to them died instantly by the bullets. He also shot in his hand, but he fell on the ground and feigned to be death. He ran away when he found chance.
On that day, Dutch army massacred 431 people of Rawagede; without legal inquiry, lawsuit nor defense. Same as in South Sulawesi, the Dutch army in Rawagede have conducted what they referred as a summary execution (standrechtelijke excecuties); an act which clearly categorized as war crimes which is murder of non-combatants. It was estimated that the actual victims were more than 431, since many have been swept away by torrential flood due to heavy rain.
The downpours caused pool of bloods continue to drench the village. What left were women and children. The next day, after the Dutch army left the village, the women buried the bodies with in-adequate equipments. One mother buried her husband and two sons aged 12 and 15 years. They could not dug deep, only 50 centimeters, which caused the stenches stayed for days.
This massacre was also known by Committee of Good Offices for Indonesia from the United Nations. But the commission’ reaction was limited to ‘critic’ against the military action which they called “deliberate and ruthless”, without further strict sanction due to human-rights abuse; let alone treating this massacre against innocent people as war crimes.
Now, there are 9 widows of the victims and 1 survivor of Rawagede massacre on December 9, 1947. The youngest, Imi, now aged 75. At that time, she was 15 years old and just married for 3 days when her husband was shot dead before her eyes. Since then, she is not married. All of them are only illiterate village people.
De Excessennota
On January 1969, under pressure of Dutch parliament, the Dutch government established a team to review archives which submitted to Dutch government, in order to investigate misconducts by Dutch military members (KL, Koninklijke Landmacht and KNIL, Koninklijke Nederlands-Indische Leger), in Indonesia during 1945-1950. After conducting analysis in 5 months, the results were compiled in a report under title “Nota betreffende het archievenonderzoek naar gegevens omtrent excessen in Indonesië begaan door Nederlandse militairen in de periode 1945-1950”, shortened as De Excessennota. This formal report was presented by Prime Minister deJong on June 2, 1969. This report which prepared in a hurry only put 140 ‘excess’ which done by Dutch army, despite many other incidents; since there were large murder cases done by Dutch military personnel were not included in the Excessennota.
In Netherlands, many parties have clearly denounce that what have been done by Dutch military during this period are war crimes (oorlogs-misdaden) and not a mere excess.
The massacre in Rawagede, South Sulawesi and many other severe crimes against humanity, are only small evidences of Dutch military’ war crimes, in its efforts to re-colonialize Indonesia, after Indonesian people declared independence.
On August 16, 2005, in Jakarta , Dutch Foreign Minister Ben Bot stated that:
“…In retrospect, it is clear that its large-scale deployment of military forces in 1947 put the Netherlands on the wrong side of history. The fact that military action was taken and that many people on both sides lost their lives or were wounded is a harsh and bitter reality especially for you, the people of the Republic of Indonesia . A large number of your people are estimated to have died as a result of the action taken by the Netherlands ...”
But this statement has been served as a mere lip service, since the Dutch government continues to remain irresponsible on various massacres on non-combatant people of Indonesia, and 60 years after these tragedies, remained unwilling to compensate the surviving victims, widows and family members of victims of Dutch army’ atrocities conducted during its military aggression in Indonesia between 1945-1950.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Petition to urge the Netherlands Government,
to recognize de jure Indonesian Independence Day was on August 17th 1945, and
to apologize for the colonialization, slavery, violation of human rights and horrific crimes against humanity
http://www.petitiononline.com/brh41244/petition.html
Thursday, January 10, 2008
Time, Aug. 04, 1947. The Dutch "Police Measures"
The Dutch first "Politionele actie", Juli 21 - August, 5, 1947 in the opinion of the international world
"Police Measures"
Time Magazine, Monday, Aug. 04, 1947
Their acts, said the Dutch last week, were only "police measures of a strictly limited character." They looked more like war. The Dutch claimed that they could rebuild the Indies only after they had subdued obstructive Republican leaders. The Dutch had a detailed plan of attack for vermiform Java: cut off the head and tail (richest rice-growing regions), then hit the heart of the Republican government at Jogjakarta in south central Java. In a week the Dutch plan had all but succeeded.
Dutch Marines, trained by the U.S. Marines, staged amphibious landings in the east and quickly took Java's richest agricultural area. Throughout Java the Dutch seized plantations, sugar mills, port installations, roads.
Indonesian scorched-earth tactics had caused some damage, chiefly to the Chinese merchant class whose houses the Republicans burned. "The population's attitude," claimed the Dutch, ". . . could hardly be bettered. . . .
From a military standpoint there is hardly any resistance worth the name." Fleeing Republican soldiers shed their shoes—the faster to run and the better to disguise themselves as peasants.
Suicide Squads. But from Jogjakarta the Republican government was still shouting defiance. The Dutch drive on the capital was stalled in the mountains north of the Republican capital. The Dutch might seize key centers of Java, but the Republicans hoped to wear them down in a long guerrilla war. Youthful (24) Major General Soetomo was organizing suicide squads called Berani Mati (Those Who Dare to Die). To belong, said Soetomo, an Indonesian must kill at least ten Dutch soldiers. He also had some advice for women fighters: sprinkle pepper in Dutch soldiers' eyes, then stone them to death.
The Dutch had gambled everything on quick military success. (Their well-trained, well-equipped army had no supplies for a long campaign.) But the political problem could not be so quickly solved. After a week of fighting, Acting Governor General Hubertus van Mook promised a "regular government." The Dutch talked of splitting the Indonesian Republic into seven autonomous (and more manageable) areas. Van Mook asked "prominent Indonesian personalities" to join him in rebuilding the country.
The Ever-Present Comrades.
But the Dutch strong-arm policy had played into the hands of extremists like top Communist Alimin Prawirodirdjo. Last year Alimin returned to Java from long exile with an up-to-the-minute party line. Like Viet Nam's Ho Chi-minh, China's Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung, he is a graduate of Moscow's Far Eastern University. Alimin's influence with Indonesian President Soekarno had long been strong. Now, since Alimin controlled the best-organized underground in Indonesia, it was stronger than ever. Alimin's advice to Soekarno: don't cooperate with the Dutch.
Meanwhile, moderate ex-Premier Sutan Sjahrir, favorite Dutch candidate to head a new Indonesian government, flew to India to mobilize world opinion against the Dutch. He found one sympathetic listener in Jawaharlal Nehru. Said Nehru last week: India will bar Dutch traffic from Indian ports and airfields. But, he added, India will not send arms to the Indonesians ; "we do not intend to be at war with the Dutch Government." Nehru promised to bring the Indonesian problem before the United Nations immediately.
"Police Measures"
Time Magazine, Monday, Aug. 04, 1947
Their acts, said the Dutch last week, were only "police measures of a strictly limited character." They looked more like war. The Dutch claimed that they could rebuild the Indies only after they had subdued obstructive Republican leaders. The Dutch had a detailed plan of attack for vermiform Java: cut off the head and tail (richest rice-growing regions), then hit the heart of the Republican government at Jogjakarta in south central Java. In a week the Dutch plan had all but succeeded.
Dutch Marines, trained by the U.S. Marines, staged amphibious landings in the east and quickly took Java's richest agricultural area. Throughout Java the Dutch seized plantations, sugar mills, port installations, roads.
Indonesian scorched-earth tactics had caused some damage, chiefly to the Chinese merchant class whose houses the Republicans burned. "The population's attitude," claimed the Dutch, ". . . could hardly be bettered. . . .
From a military standpoint there is hardly any resistance worth the name." Fleeing Republican soldiers shed their shoes—the faster to run and the better to disguise themselves as peasants.
Suicide Squads. But from Jogjakarta the Republican government was still shouting defiance. The Dutch drive on the capital was stalled in the mountains north of the Republican capital. The Dutch might seize key centers of Java, but the Republicans hoped to wear them down in a long guerrilla war. Youthful (24) Major General Soetomo was organizing suicide squads called Berani Mati (Those Who Dare to Die). To belong, said Soetomo, an Indonesian must kill at least ten Dutch soldiers. He also had some advice for women fighters: sprinkle pepper in Dutch soldiers' eyes, then stone them to death.
The Dutch had gambled everything on quick military success. (Their well-trained, well-equipped army had no supplies for a long campaign.) But the political problem could not be so quickly solved. After a week of fighting, Acting Governor General Hubertus van Mook promised a "regular government." The Dutch talked of splitting the Indonesian Republic into seven autonomous (and more manageable) areas. Van Mook asked "prominent Indonesian personalities" to join him in rebuilding the country.
The Ever-Present Comrades.
But the Dutch strong-arm policy had played into the hands of extremists like top Communist Alimin Prawirodirdjo. Last year Alimin returned to Java from long exile with an up-to-the-minute party line. Like Viet Nam's Ho Chi-minh, China's Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung, he is a graduate of Moscow's Far Eastern University. Alimin's influence with Indonesian President Soekarno had long been strong. Now, since Alimin controlled the best-organized underground in Indonesia, it was stronger than ever. Alimin's advice to Soekarno: don't cooperate with the Dutch.
Meanwhile, moderate ex-Premier Sutan Sjahrir, favorite Dutch candidate to head a new Indonesian government, flew to India to mobilize world opinion against the Dutch. He found one sympathetic listener in Jawaharlal Nehru. Said Nehru last week: India will bar Dutch traffic from Indian ports and airfields. But, he added, India will not send arms to the Indonesians ; "we do not intend to be at war with the Dutch Government." Nehru promised to bring the Indonesian problem before the United Nations immediately.
Thursday, January 3, 2008
Ir. Soekarno. TIME Magazine, Dec. 23, 1946
Monday, Dec. 23, 1946
What time is it in Indonesia? Last week the public clocks which the punctual Dutch had placed along Batavia's sweltering, mosquito-infested streets did not say; nobody had wound them. Nobody collected electric bills, because the electrical engineers are Dutch and the company accountants Indonesian; they could not decide who should get the receipts.
Batavia had two mayors, one Dutch, one Indonesian; two flags, one Queen Wilhelmina's and one Ir. Soekarno's; two currencies, neither of which could buy much, and two possible destinies: it might become the chief city of the first great Moslem colony to free itself from European rule, or it might come to symbolize the first wave of Asiatic nationalism to break into chaos.
By last week it was clearly too late in Indonesia for restoration of full Dutch imperial rule, too early for stable native government. Was it too late for cooperation between Dutch and Indonesians in a framework of expanding independence? From Batavia, TIME Correspondent Robert Sherrod cabled a gloomy forecast :
"Throughout most of Asia, the white man is truly hated and the sky is black with chickens coming home to roost—probably blacker in Indonesia than anywhere except Indo-China. The natives' passions run away with their leaders' intellects. I am inclined to doubt whether whites and colored will work together in this generation."
"We Cannot Stop Her." In Amsterdam, 9,900 miles away, Dutchmen could not bring themselves to accept so pessimistic a view, which would spell catastrophe for their country. Said Pieter de Jong, a middle-of-the-road Dutch businessman: "We've already lost our trade with Germany. If we lose Indonesia too, The Netherlands will become one of the poorest countries on the Continent. If Indonesia really wants complete freedom, we are not going to stop her and we cannot stop her. But we Netherlanders sincerely hope the Indonesians have some common sense left. If we move out, the Indonesians will be a prey to Communism or to ruthless big business."
Last week at The Hague, Johannes A. Jonkman, Minister of Overseas Territories, struggled with the job of putting Citizen de Jong's fears into political terms. Jonkman, who lost all his hair in a Jap prison camp in the Indies, worked so hard to draft his speech to The Netherlands States-General that friends feared his health would break down. After he made the speech, interpreting the proposed pact between the Dutch Government and Soekarno's rebel Indonesian government, Holland's politicians and people were still as unhappy and undecided about the issue as Pieter de Jong.
The pact recognizes Sumatra, Java and little Madura as the Republic of Indonesia, whose degree of independence will be great, but is deliberately left vague. Borneo and the Great East (see map) will be left under Dutch control. Both the Dutch and the Indonesian nationalists agree to work toward a federation which would bring the whole Netherlands East Indies into a future United States of Indonesia, a sort of Dominion under the Dutch Crown. Further negotiations to clarify the pact are expected. Meanwhile, the Indonesians think that events are moving too slowly toward independence, and the Dutch think they are going too rapidly.
"We Are Losing the War." The Dutch are hurt and bewildered at what they consider native ingratitude. For generations the Dutch regarded themselves as the world's model colonizers. Now their very benefactions are turned against them.
They introduced sanitation and Western medicine, and raised the standard of living. Result: the Javanese population rose from 35,000,000 in 1920 to 42,000,000, became too big for little Holland (9.000,000) to handle.
The Dutch raised the shamefully low literacy rate to a less shameful 10%. Result: educated Indonesians became the worst enemies of the mother country.
The Dutch established some safeguards against big business exploitation of the natives. Result: Indonesian leaders, some of whom are rich, now feel that they can manage their fabulously rich archipelago (37% of the world's rubber, 3% of its oil, 91% of its quinine), preferably through public ownership of key industries.
The Dutch were reluctant to admit that native unrest has been stirring for years. Some Hollanders were inclined to blame it all on the Japs. Said Pieter Sjoerds Gerbrandy, The Netherlands' wartime Premier in Exile: "We are in danger of losing the war." Others blamed it all on a Jap puppet. Said an Amsterdam cigar-store proprietor last week: "This fellow Soekarno is just a crook and a collaborator who is certainly going to turn Communist within the next five years. We have killed our own quisling Mussert in Holland—we ought to shoot Soekarho too."
Boola, Boola.
As a matter of fact, Soekarno lives in terror of assassination, although the passionate loyalty and vigilance of the men around him would make an attempt difficult. Few men in the postwar world evoke the fanatic devotion of millions as does this 45-year-old child of luck and revolution. He is tall for an Indonesian (5 ft. 8 in.) and, by native standards, superlatively handsome. His Malay is self-consciously choice; in fact, he is so insistent on advancing the native speech that he is called Indonesia's Webster (meaning Noah, not Daniel). He is quite an orator, too—TIME'S Sherrod cabled the following picture of Soekarno addressing an audience of 5,000 women:
"Mostly he spoke extemporaneously (65 minutes). Occasionally he slipped on horn-rimmed spectacles, read a note. I have never seen an orator who held an audience in the palm of his hand so easily and confidently. Soekarno would speak slowly, then at machine-gun pace. Some times he shook a finger at the audience, again he stood arms akimbo and bit off his words. The fascinated audience laughed with him, grew serious with him, sympathized with him when he said he had just come from a sickbed and had to wear a light raincoat (which he took off after half an hour)."
Sample of Soekarno's oratory: "Our ideal is an automobile for everybody. . . ." (At present few cars travel Java's pot-holed roads.) "I've just received a letter from a young girl who wants to be an airplane pilot. . . . That's right, hitch your aims to the stars. . . . We can laugh, we can eat and some day we can have clothes. . . . But our ideals will not be realized easily. We must struggle for them."
Wherever he alights on his speaking tour around the country, a long red carpet is rolled out for him. When he finishes, the audience sings the new national anthem Indonesia Raja. The tune is almost a direct steal from Boola, Boola; the refrain starts:
Indonesia tanah airku, tanah tumpah darahku,
Disanalah aku berdiri, mendjaga pandu ibuku.
"Mister Merdeka." At the end of each speech he punches out, with clenched fists, three thunderous cheers: "Merdeka [Freedom]! Merdeka! Merdeka!" His followers roar the word, plaster it on billboards, use it as the Nazis used Heil Hitler in telephone greetings. Affectionately, they call their leader "Mister Merdeka."
He could do with a nickname. Soekarno is his first name, and it is almost as common in Java as Hans is in Holland. Indonesians are careless about surnames, and Soekarno lost his somewhere along the rocky way of a life that began humbly in Surabaya. Young Soekarno was one of those bright, indifferent students who frequently turn out to be politicians.
He set out to become an architect. At the Bandung Technical Institute he got a degree in civil engineering, which entitles him to put Ir. in front of his name (Ir. is a contraction of ingenieur, Dutch for engineer). Soekarno's architectural career was as short as his professional title. He designed a few Chinese homes and was commissioned to do a Moslem mosque (most Java mosques are hideous tin-roofed stucco monstrosities, in contrast to the lovely ruins of the vanquished Hindu temples).
Moonlight & Santayana.
Soekarno gave up architecture. But though politics has been his occupation, he has not lost his interest in art. His Batavia house contains one of the finest collections of Indonesian paintings, especially moonlit mountain and jungle scenes. His favorite artist is the younger Abdullah, who painted a hauntingly lovely portrait of Soekarno's present wife (he married her because his first wife bore him no children; by the second he has a young son). When Soekarno was paid 800 guilders a month by the Japs, he used to give Artist Abdullah 100.
At an early age he read Shakespeare, Lincoln, Rousseau, John Dewey and Santayana—a mixed bag of Western thought that may have contributed to the confusion and indecisiveness that runs through his political career.
Soekarno, like thousands of other young Indonesian intellectuals, was a wavering moderate in his opposition to Dutch rule. In 1926 the Dutch made a major blunder. In suppressing a Communist uprising, they exiled 4,500 Indonesians, without trial, to New Guinea. Soekarno became an uncompromising (but nonCommunist) nationalist, reached out for power, achieved a considerable following before being exiled to Flores Island in 1934.
He was still on Flores when the Japs attacked the N.E.I. In eight days the Dutch lost Java. Gallant but inept, the Dutch Navy bungled into calamity and the Dutch air force was destroyed. Thereafter, it would have been pointless, militarily, for the Dutch Army to attempt resistance. To the Indonesians, however, the Army was the symbol of Dutch rule. When the Army did not fight and Dutch Governor General A. W. L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer* fled to Australia, the Indonesians lost all respect for the Dutch. Millions of Indonesians swallowed the Jap slogan "Asia for the Asiatics."
Umbrella & Bicycle.
Soekarno's career well illustrates how intensely the natives felt about the Dutch. Soekarno rounded up thousands of his countrymen, who later died as Jap slave laborers in Borneo and New Guinea. Half a day after the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, he was still boasting that "thousands of Indonesian youths have entered the ranks of [Japanese] suicide squads." Yet when the Japanese Army proclaimed the Indonesian Republic (on Aug. 17, 1945, two days after Japan surrendered) and appointed Soekarno President, the Indonesians greeted him with acclaim.
Had the Allies landed immediately, Soekarno's career would have been cut short. But in the six weeks that elapsed before British troops, under Lieut. General Sir Philip Christison, arrived in Java, Soekarno had a chance to consolidate his "independent" government. Christison gave Soekarno another break by announcing, "I am not going to Java to return the country to the Dutch." Soekarno used this statement to build up his people's confidence that they could successfully resist the return of imperial rule. For 14 months the Republican Army fought British and Dutch occupation troops. By the time the British withdrew last month their casualties were 600 killed, 1,320 wounded and 320 missing.
The Indies Dutch, many of them jittery after years in Japanese concentration camps, underestimated the nationalist movement. One Dutch matron summed up their tragically mistaken attitude: "All the natives want from this world is three things: an umbrella, a pair of slippers and a bicycle." One conspicuous exception to this complacency was Dr. Hubertus van Mook, the urbane, Java-born diplomat, who returned to Java as Acting Governor General convinced that the Dutch had to make major concessions.
Valedictorian.
Because van Mook at first had refused to treat with collaborators, Soekarno induced a rival native leader, Sjahrir, to become his Prime Minister—a move that turned out to be the smartest Soekarno ever made. Smoother and brighter than Soekarno, and with a clean anti-Japanese record, Sjahrir had everything—except the adulation of the Indonesian masses. Sjahrir quickly adjusted himself to the role of Soekarno's front man in Batavia, while Soekarno left Batavia for the cool hill city, Jogjakarta, where he could indulge both his love of comfort and his sense of historic irony. Soekarno luxuriated in the terraced, marble-floored mansion that once belonged to the Dutch Resident. Near the mansion are the ruins of Borobudur, the massive Buddhist temple where Java's kings worshiped eight centuries before the Dutch came to the archipelago.
Sjahrir (whose favorite author is Ernest Hemingway, and who sponsored American dancing parties for Javanese youngsters as a protest against Jap occupation) got along well with Westerners. He played tennis several times a week with British Consul General John MacKereth. When the British troops left last month, Sjahrir delivered a graceful but two-edged valedictory: "You introduced to our country by your personal qualities some attractive traits of Western culture that our people have rarely seen before from the white people they know. I mean your politeness, kindness, dignified self-restraint."
Asked van Mook: "What did you mean by that remark?"
Said Sjahrir: "When your troops leave Indonesia I'll say things twice as nice about the Dutch."
Meanwhile British diplomacy, first in the person of Sir Archibald Clark Kerr (now Lord Inverchapel), who was succeeded by Lord Killearn, continued its efforts to bring the Dutch and the Indonesians together. Former Dutch Premier Willem Schermerhorn, who had blamed van Mook for dealing with collaborators, came out to Java and soon found himself discussing the situation over Scotch & soda with Soekarno, whose Mohammedanism is not so rigid that he scorns a drink.
The pact now before the Dutch States-General was drafted last month at Linggadjati. There, with Lord Killearn in the chair, Schermerhorn, van Mook and Soekarno (Sjahrir had one of his frequent colds) haggled out an agreement. The issue finally boiled down to a sentence in Article 2 which referred to Indonesia as a "free democratic state." Soekarno's Economics Minister, 38-year-old A. K. Gani (who once acted in a Batavian-made movie True Love), objected: "That word 'free' is not enough. It should be 'sovereign.' " Van Mook turned to Soekarno: "Will you accept the agreement if it is changed to sovereign?" Almost before he knew it, Soekarno said yes, and the agreement was signed.
Ice in the Jungle.
Today, while the Indies wait upon The Netherlands' reaction to the pact, a truce—but no peace—prevails in Indonesia. The Indonesian Army, led by hotheaded young General Soedirman, continues to snipe at units of the 92,000 Dutch troops under Lieut. General S. H. Spoor. Actually, in Java the Dutch hold only three small areas: the cities of Surabaya, Semarang and a corridor two to six miles wide connecting and including Batavia and Bandung. Of Java's 51,000 square miles, the Dutch hold perhaps 380 square miles. In Sumatra the Dutch control three areas (at Palembang, Padang and Medan), less than 76 square miles out of 164,147.
In the interior, life goes on as if the Dutch would never come again. Recently a highly respected Dutch educator, P. J. Koets, shocked Holland with a realistic report of stability and progress in the nationalist area. Wrote Koets: "The picture in general is of a society consolidating itself, and not in the course of dissolution. . . . What struck me was the quiet and peacefulness. The farmer is busy on the farm, the women planting or harvesting, the people gathered at the market place, peddlers with heavy loads along the roads, the dogtrot of the carrier with his load on his back, a merchant on his way to the next village. . . . I had a long talk with a Republican leader whom I'd known in Holland. He used the comparison with water in the course of freezing. Consolidation, he said, is like water that freezes on top; there are large stretches where one can walk over in safety because the ice is thick and strong. There are parts where one can walk, but hear the threatening sound of cracking, and there are sections where only a thin skin of ice is forming, and over the deepest spots there are still open cracks. But the process of freezing continues, consolidation is progressing."
Can the Indonesians govern themselves? Says Correspondent Sherrod: "They have done surprisingly well, and with some assistance—Dutch or otherwise—I think they can. Van Mook says the Indonesians have matured more in the past five years than in the previous 50."
Gin on the Terrace.
In Batavia last week some of the old, prewar hallmarks of empire were still present. The tuan besar (Dutch for pukka sahibs) sat in their white linen suits and drank fiery Bols gin on the terrace of the Harmonie Club. Every now & then in the evening their talk was disturbed by a bullet whizzing by from the lines outside the city.
News more disquieting than casual bullets came last week. The Dutch had assumed that their friends, the local sultans of the Great East islands, would not be troubled by rebellion. But now there was insurrection in Celebes, and even reports of trouble in Amboina, where Indonesia's most loyal native troops are recruited.
Most of the Indies Dutch now realize that the old days will never come again. The Dutch at home are beginning to understand that Ir. Soekarno & Co. are attempting to engineer a complete break, economic as well as political. As a result Holland's earlier, more tolerant attitude toward Indonesian home rule is stiffening. But at best the Dutch faced a pretty grim prospect. Sardonic Hubertus van Mook put it this way: "There will be shooting for a long time in Indonesia, but we hope to get it on a friendlier basis."
* After Holland was liberated, Queen Wilhelmina gave Starkenborgh an audience in The Hague. He drove to the palace in his automobile, sent the driver back because he was sure the audience would last several hours; doubtless the Queen would have him to lunch. Much to his surprise the Queen ended the interview in 15 minutes. Starkenborgh went home by trolley.
Find this article at:
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,793324,00.html
or
Special thanks to Dorpi Parlindungan, who sent me this article.
Oppositie wil erkenning 17 augustus
UTRECHT - 05/08/05 - (Novum) -
Nederland moet 17 augustus erkennen als officiële onafhankelijkheidsdatum van Indonesië.
Dat vinden de fracties van de PvdA en de SP in de Tweede Kamer. SP-Kamerlid Krista van Velzen roept minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Ben Bot (CDA) vrijdag in een open brief op de datum officieel te erkennen. Haar PvdA-collega Bert Koenders deed datzelfde vorig jaar februari.
Bot woont dit jaar de vieringen rond de Indonesische onafhankelijkheidsverklaring bij. Hij is de eerste Nederlandse bewindsman die dat doet. Van Velzen en Koenders vinden dit de ideale gelegenheid om 17 augustus officieel te erkennen.
Van Velzen zegt verbaasd te zijn dat Bot de onafhankelijkheidsviering bijwoont, terwijl de Nederlandse regering de datum niet erkent. Bot moet volgens haar excuses aanbieden voor de slachtoffers die tijdens de politionele acties aan Indonesische zijde zijn gevallen. "De tijd is rijp om in het reine te komen met fouten uit het Nederlandse koloniale verleden", zegt Van Velzen in haar brief.
Koenders vindt dat Bot bij het bezoek aan Indonesië 'de ruimte moet nemen om een heldere verklaring namens Nederland af te leggen'. Daartoe moet Bot de Indonesische media opzoeken, vindt de sociaal-democraat. Vorig jaar zei de minister, zelf geboren in de voormalige kolonie, 'sympathiek' te staan tegenover de oproep van Koenders.
De Indonesische nationalist Soekarno riep op 17 augustus 1945 de Indonesische onafhankelijkheid uit. Vier maanden later, op 27 december 1945, droeg de Nederlandse regering officieel de macht over. Nederland heeft 17 augustus nooit als officiële onafhankelijkheidsdatum erkend. Het is een gevoelig onderwerp bij oud-militairen. Zij vinden dat Nederland destijds de plicht had militair op te treden tegen de Indonesische vrijheidsstrijders en de orde te handhaven middels politionele acties.
De stichting Platform van Veteranen zegt in een reactie dat de aanwezigheid van Bot bij de vieringen in Indonesië niet meer zo gevoelig ligt als in het verleden. Zestig jaar na dato verzetten de oud-strijders zich niet meer tegen een eventuele erkenning van 17 augustus als datum, zegt Albert Blok, vice-voorzitter van de organisatie, op eigen titel.
Tiscali/Novum
Nederland moet 17 augustus erkennen als officiële onafhankelijkheidsdatum van Indonesië.
Dat vinden de fracties van de PvdA en de SP in de Tweede Kamer. SP-Kamerlid Krista van Velzen roept minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Ben Bot (CDA) vrijdag in een open brief op de datum officieel te erkennen. Haar PvdA-collega Bert Koenders deed datzelfde vorig jaar februari.
Bot woont dit jaar de vieringen rond de Indonesische onafhankelijkheidsverklaring bij. Hij is de eerste Nederlandse bewindsman die dat doet. Van Velzen en Koenders vinden dit de ideale gelegenheid om 17 augustus officieel te erkennen.
Van Velzen zegt verbaasd te zijn dat Bot de onafhankelijkheidsviering bijwoont, terwijl de Nederlandse regering de datum niet erkent. Bot moet volgens haar excuses aanbieden voor de slachtoffers die tijdens de politionele acties aan Indonesische zijde zijn gevallen. "De tijd is rijp om in het reine te komen met fouten uit het Nederlandse koloniale verleden", zegt Van Velzen in haar brief.
Koenders vindt dat Bot bij het bezoek aan Indonesië 'de ruimte moet nemen om een heldere verklaring namens Nederland af te leggen'. Daartoe moet Bot de Indonesische media opzoeken, vindt de sociaal-democraat. Vorig jaar zei de minister, zelf geboren in de voormalige kolonie, 'sympathiek' te staan tegenover de oproep van Koenders.
De Indonesische nationalist Soekarno riep op 17 augustus 1945 de Indonesische onafhankelijkheid uit. Vier maanden later, op 27 december 1945, droeg de Nederlandse regering officieel de macht over. Nederland heeft 17 augustus nooit als officiële onafhankelijkheidsdatum erkend. Het is een gevoelig onderwerp bij oud-militairen. Zij vinden dat Nederland destijds de plicht had militair op te treden tegen de Indonesische vrijheidsstrijders en de orde te handhaven middels politionele acties.
De stichting Platform van Veteranen zegt in een reactie dat de aanwezigheid van Bot bij de vieringen in Indonesië niet meer zo gevoelig ligt als in het verleden. Zestig jaar na dato verzetten de oud-strijders zich niet meer tegen een eventuele erkenning van 17 augustus als datum, zegt Albert Blok, vice-voorzitter van de organisatie, op eigen titel.
Tiscali/Novum
Open brief aan minister Bot: Erken datum Indonesische onafhankelijkheid
05-08-2005 •
Minister Bot woont op 17 augustus in Jakarta de zestigste viering bij van de onafhankelijkheidsdag van Indonesië. SP-Kamerlid Krista van Velzen vraagt de minister in een open brief verder te gaan en eindelijk deze datum te erkennen als de datum van de Indonesische onafhankelijkheid. Ook moet Bot voor de politionele acties namens Nederland excuses aanbieden aan de Indonesische bevolking.
Geachte minister,
Enigszins verrast maar zeker verheugd vernam ik dat u besloten heeft aanwezig te zijn bij de vieringen van de zestigjarige Indonesische onafhankelijkheid. Verrast, omdat de verschillende kabinetten tot nu toe altijd erg verkrampt omgingen met het al dan niet erkennen van de datum van 17 augustus 1945 als de dag waarop Indonesië onafhankelijk werd.
Dat is niet onbegrijpelijk: erkenning van deze datum als onafhankelijkheidsdag betekent dat de Nederlandse regering erkent dat er een verkeerde keuze is gemaakt door van 1947 tot 1949 met grootschalige militaire operaties te pogen het land als kolonie te behouden. Ook kan erkenning van de onafhankelijkheidsdag slecht vallen bij Indië-veteranen, die in naam van het vaderland naar Indonesië werden gezonden. Velen deden dat niet eens uit vrije keus. Zij gingen als dienstplichtige, maar wel in de veronderstelling een rechtvaardige militaire actie uit te voeren. Ik ben dan ook verheugd dat u heeft besloten het traditionele gekrakeel achter u te laten en op 17 augustus in Jakarta aanwezig te zijn.
Tot mijn verbazing vernam ik echter dat uw aanwezigheid niet betekent dat Nederland 17 augustus nu officieel als onafhankelijkheidsdag erkent. U gaat dus wel naar Indonesië om te vieren dat het zestig jaar onafhankelijk is van Nederland, maar u wilt dit niet officieel erkennen! Ik denk dat deze dubbelhartige houding nergens voor nodig is. U zult het met mij eens zijn dat de Indonesische bevolking het volste recht had de onafhankelijkheid uit te roepen. De politionele acties van 1947-1949 zijn naar mijn mening een historische misstap geweest, die ten koste ging van vele duizenden mensenlevens aan Nederlandse en Indonesische zijde. Daarnaast ligt er een nieuw feit, namelijk dat woordvoerders van de verschillende verenigingen van Indië-gangers aangeven dat uw aanwezigheid bij de vieringen absoluut niet zo gevoelig ligt als in het verleden, al was het maar omdat hun hoge leeftijd zorgt voor meer berusting. Al met al denk ik dat de tijd rijp is om in het reine te komen met fouten uit het Nederlandse koloniale verleden.
Ik wil bij deze een beroep op u doen er voor te zorgen dat uw aanwezigheid bij de onafhankelijkheidsviering een ware kentering in de Nederlandse houding wordt ten opzichte van het verleden met Indonesië. Erken 17 augustus officieel als de enige en echte onafhankelijkheidsdag en biedt namens de Nederlandse regering uw excuses aan de Indonesische bevolking aan voor het leed dat zij heeft ondervonden door de politionele acties. Tegelijkertijd zou u een bijeenkomst moeten organiseren met Indië-veteranen om hen duidelijk te maken dat het aanbieden van excuses aan de Indonesische bevolking niet zozeer een veroordeling inhoud van het handelen van deze Indië-veteranen, maar gezien moet worden als het afkeuren van een besluit van een regering om tegen beter weten in mensenlevens te offeren voor het in stand houden van een koloniale ambitie. Op deze manier kan dit boek, met een niet al te fraaie episode uit de Nederlandse geschiedenis, eindelijk gesloten worden.
Hoogachtend,
Krista van Velzen, lid van de Tweede Kamer voor de SP
(Deze open brief is op 4 augustus 2005 gepubliceerd in de Haagsche Courant)
Minister Bot woont op 17 augustus in Jakarta de zestigste viering bij van de onafhankelijkheidsdag van Indonesië. SP-Kamerlid Krista van Velzen vraagt de minister in een open brief verder te gaan en eindelijk deze datum te erkennen als de datum van de Indonesische onafhankelijkheid. Ook moet Bot voor de politionele acties namens Nederland excuses aanbieden aan de Indonesische bevolking.
Geachte minister,
Enigszins verrast maar zeker verheugd vernam ik dat u besloten heeft aanwezig te zijn bij de vieringen van de zestigjarige Indonesische onafhankelijkheid. Verrast, omdat de verschillende kabinetten tot nu toe altijd erg verkrampt omgingen met het al dan niet erkennen van de datum van 17 augustus 1945 als de dag waarop Indonesië onafhankelijk werd.
Dat is niet onbegrijpelijk: erkenning van deze datum als onafhankelijkheidsdag betekent dat de Nederlandse regering erkent dat er een verkeerde keuze is gemaakt door van 1947 tot 1949 met grootschalige militaire operaties te pogen het land als kolonie te behouden. Ook kan erkenning van de onafhankelijkheidsdag slecht vallen bij Indië-veteranen, die in naam van het vaderland naar Indonesië werden gezonden. Velen deden dat niet eens uit vrije keus. Zij gingen als dienstplichtige, maar wel in de veronderstelling een rechtvaardige militaire actie uit te voeren. Ik ben dan ook verheugd dat u heeft besloten het traditionele gekrakeel achter u te laten en op 17 augustus in Jakarta aanwezig te zijn.
Tot mijn verbazing vernam ik echter dat uw aanwezigheid niet betekent dat Nederland 17 augustus nu officieel als onafhankelijkheidsdag erkent. U gaat dus wel naar Indonesië om te vieren dat het zestig jaar onafhankelijk is van Nederland, maar u wilt dit niet officieel erkennen! Ik denk dat deze dubbelhartige houding nergens voor nodig is. U zult het met mij eens zijn dat de Indonesische bevolking het volste recht had de onafhankelijkheid uit te roepen. De politionele acties van 1947-1949 zijn naar mijn mening een historische misstap geweest, die ten koste ging van vele duizenden mensenlevens aan Nederlandse en Indonesische zijde. Daarnaast ligt er een nieuw feit, namelijk dat woordvoerders van de verschillende verenigingen van Indië-gangers aangeven dat uw aanwezigheid bij de vieringen absoluut niet zo gevoelig ligt als in het verleden, al was het maar omdat hun hoge leeftijd zorgt voor meer berusting. Al met al denk ik dat de tijd rijp is om in het reine te komen met fouten uit het Nederlandse koloniale verleden.
Ik wil bij deze een beroep op u doen er voor te zorgen dat uw aanwezigheid bij de onafhankelijkheidsviering een ware kentering in de Nederlandse houding wordt ten opzichte van het verleden met Indonesië. Erken 17 augustus officieel als de enige en echte onafhankelijkheidsdag en biedt namens de Nederlandse regering uw excuses aan de Indonesische bevolking aan voor het leed dat zij heeft ondervonden door de politionele acties. Tegelijkertijd zou u een bijeenkomst moeten organiseren met Indië-veteranen om hen duidelijk te maken dat het aanbieden van excuses aan de Indonesische bevolking niet zozeer een veroordeling inhoud van het handelen van deze Indië-veteranen, maar gezien moet worden als het afkeuren van een besluit van een regering om tegen beter weten in mensenlevens te offeren voor het in stand houden van een koloniale ambitie. Op deze manier kan dit boek, met een niet al te fraaie episode uit de Nederlandse geschiedenis, eindelijk gesloten worden.
Hoogachtend,
Krista van Velzen, lid van de Tweede Kamer voor de SP
(Deze open brief is op 4 augustus 2005 gepubliceerd in de Haagsche Courant)
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